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FOREWORD: 100 YEARS UNDER THE INCOME TAX 
Charlotte Crane* 
This past year was the hundredth year that the modern income tax has 
been collected. No one, critics or fans alike, can deny the importance of 
this institution in shaping the political landscape of the United States in the 
twentieth century. One can speculate that the income tax has been the focus 
of more political energy, both inside and outside Washington, than any 
other single topic during those hundred years. To mark this anniversary, on 
April 5, 2013, the Northwestern University Law Review and the Tax 
Program at Northwestern sponsored a symposium at which the papers in 
this volume were presented. 
Together these papers explore the introduction and evolution of the 
income tax as a political and legal institution. The modern income tax has 
been remarkably durable. This was not inevitable. Indeed, Congress first 
used an income tax (along with a wide variety of other tax instruments) to 
fund the Civil War. Once that conflict was over, the early income tax was 
allowed to expire. But over the next decades, demand grew for a tax that 
would effectively reach more sources of wealth than were touched by the 
traditional state property taxes. Demand also grew for an approach to 
funding the federal government that avoided the political morass associated 
with the tariff. These pressures together resulted in the 1898 income tax, 
which was struck down on constitutional grounds in Pollock v. Farmers’ 
Loan & Trust Co.1 before it could have much practical impact. The tax 
nevertheless had become a fixture in the political imagination of the nation. 
The movement in support of a federal income tax swelled again a 
decade later. Perhaps as much at the urging of income tax opponents (who 
hoped the delay involved in ratifying a constitutional amendment would 
sap the movement’s strength) as at the insistence of its supporters, the 
provision that would become the Sixteenth Amendment was sent to the 
states for ratification in 1909. It was adopted by the states relatively 
quickly, with a sufficient number of states reporting their ratification to 
allow its enactment in the spring of 1913. Eric Jensen’s contribution to this 
volume, Did the Sixteenth Amendment Ever Matter? Does It Matter 
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Today?, reminds us of the constitutional backdrop for these political 
developments and its continued relevance today. 
Tax historians have typically identified the political pressure leading 
to the income tax as coming largely from progressives and populists, who 
sought to broaden the tax base beyond real and personal property (the base 
relied upon with decreasing success by the states) and tariffs on imports 
(relied upon by the federal government not only for revenue but also for 
trade and economic policy). With a broader base than could effectively be 
tapped by these older measures and with an appropriately progressive set of 
rates, the income tax was seen not just as a tool for raising revenue but also 
as a tool for income redistribution. 
Robin Einhorn, in Look Away Dixieland: The South and the Federal 
Income Tax, adds to this standard story the politics of the South in the 
twilight of the nineteenth century. Although the progressive political 
movement may have created a rift in the Republican Party great enough to 
allow Democratic gains in Congress as Woodrow Wilson became 
President, the ratification and enactment of the income tax could never 
have been accomplished without the support of the South. A shift from the 
tariff to the income tax was anticipated as a double victory by most of the 
South: first, the tax allowed the lessening of the protectionist tariff and its 
perceived unfair burdens on the Southern economy, and second, the tax 
could replace the tariff with a source of federal money that was highly 
likely to result in payments made by the industrial North that would fund 
increased federal spending in the South. 
The onset of World War I only a few years after the enactment of the 
1913 tax undoubtedly contributed to its acceptance. The role of the federal 
government and therefore its revenue needs underwent dramatic changes in 
these years, and the reach of the income tax was broadened in response. 
But the permanence of the tax as a political institution would not be 
established until the decade after the War had ended, when the tax, albeit 
contracted, remained in place. In The Consistency of Conservative Tax 
Policy, Marjorie Kornhauser examines the political debates of the 1920s 
regarding the advisability of retaining the tax. She finds remarkable 
continuity between those debates and the debates surrounding the tax 
today: liberals tend to want to deal with the tax as an institution entirely 
separate from the spending it enables, while conservatives continue to 
question its place in the free market, federalist system they endorse. 
The income tax was expected by its supporters to be both broad based 
and progressive. The contributions of Henry Ordower, Schedularity in U.S. 
Income Taxation and Its Effect on Tax Distribution, and Tracey Roberts, 
Brackets: A Historical Perspective, examine the extent to which these 
expectations have been fulfilled. The expansion of the tax base itself meant 
that the tax would shift the overall financial burden of government in the 
United States. Ordower demonstrates that although the tax is often touted 
as being imposed on “income from all sources,” in reality it is more 
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schedular (that is, imposed differently on income from different sources) 
than most observers realize. This characteristic also undermines the extent 
to which the tax is as progressive as its nominal rate structures might 
suggest. 
Roberts examines the history of the income tax’s rate structure and 
how the rates have responded to various political changes, documenting the 
income tax’s shift from a progressive tax on a limited number of taxpayers 
to a mass tax on most wage earners. She reveals that it is starkly less 
progressive now than at many times during its history, both when one looks 
at the level at which no higher bracket exists (holding steady at under 
$500,000 since the early 1990s, in contrast to above $1,500,000 until the 
early 1960s) and at the level at which a taxpayer leaves the lowest brackets 
(starting at about $70,000 in the first income tax and dropping to about 
$10,000, where it has been since the late 1960s).2 In the same vein, she 
notes that in the political debates about the appropriate rate structure, 
discussions of its use as a tool of economic policy have increasingly 
displaced debates about equity and the redistribution of resources. 
Among the factors that contributed to the dissatisfaction with pre-
income tax revenue measures was the extent to which the evolution of the 
American economy had enabled taxpayers to avoid paying them. By the 
late nineteenth century, the real property taxes imposed by the states no 
longer captured the wealth of the richest Americans, which was 
increasingly held in corporate stocks and bonds. Taxes on this wealth, 
whether in the form of intangible property taxes or excise taxes on paid-in 
capital, could easily be frustrated by changes in the situs of the entities and 
by other innovations in their organization. Although state-based property 
taxes could not tap into the wealth associated with growing and moving 
business enterprises, through an income tax, a portion of the income flows 
generated by such enterprises could be diverted as government revenues. 
There is therefore considerable irony in the fact that the income tax has 
endured as a revenue source in large part because of its ability to so divert 
wage income (but not capital income) as a result of reliance on 
withholding. In What a History of Tax Withholding Tells Us About the 
Relationship Between Statutes and Constitutional Law, Anuj Desai 
examines the experience of the United States with withholding, a practice 
that in earlier implementations included payments of interest and 
dividends, not just payments by employers to employees. In Desai’s view, 
the introduction of wage withholding and the enlistment by the federal 
government of employers in the revenue-generating process marked an 
important step in establishing the current fiscal foundations both for Social 
Security and for the general revenue needs of the United States, even 
 
2 These figures are all in inflation-adjusted dollars. The analysis of the lowest bracket takes into 
account only those items usually included in discussions of the “zero-bracket” amount, and not the 
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though the practice may not have become a quasi-constitutional entrenched 
institution. Much remains for others to explore about the World War II 
developments through which the federal government enlisted large 
employers motivated by provisions in the income tax law as the mechanism 
for the distribution of social benefits, including retirement income and 
healthcare, especially when contrasted with the government’s failed 
attempts to similarly enlist financial institutions in the administration of the 
tax. 
Although the fiscal challenges faced by the states in the early decades 
of the twentieth century may have contributed to the acceptance of new 
federal sources of revenue, there was little appetite for abandoning the 
states either as separate fiscal entities or as the source of most substantive 
law. Although many have suggested that the success of the income tax as a 
revenue source has precluded the states from maintaining their own fiscal 
policies, Brian Galle’s findings in Does Federal Spending “Coerce” 
States? Evidence from State Budgets suggest that the federal government’s 
financial strength does not need to come at the cost of the fiscal 
incapacitation of the states. 
Even more certainly, the increasing fiscal strength of the federal 
government did not result in an abandonment of the states as the source of 
most substantive law. The extent to which the federal income tax has 
operated primarily as an overlay on state law relationships and institutions 
has raised continual challenges for the income tax. The income tax statute 
has always been written as if such things as “interest,” “equity,” “gifts,” 
and “employee” had some intrinsic and unavoidable meaning. Taxpayers 
have always had an incentive to relabel and even to restructure their 
relationships in ways that do not fit easily into the categories the statute as 
written relies on. Indeed, taxpayers are likely to seek the assistance of state 
courts and state legislatures to help them in this restructuring. Such 
incentives led to the major alterations in state community property laws 
that occurred during the 1940s, aimed at allowing income splitting by 
married couples, and, more recently, to the wholesale revisions of the laws 
governing business entities through the invention of LLCs in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century. In A Bundle of Confusion for the Income 
Tax: What It Means to Own Something, Stephanie McMahon outlines the 
early attempts of the income tax to classify state law relationships and to 
identify property, the “owner” of that property, and the income streams 
related to it, a quest that remains elusive today. In Tax-Free 
Reorganizations: The Evolution and Revolution of Triangular Mergers, 
Stephanie Hoffer and Dale Oesterle examine the difficulties inherent when 
federal tax concepts must be superimposed on ever-changing state law 
rules regarding the restructuring of corporate holdings. Both of these 
inquiries point out the difficulty encountered by the federal income tax 
when it is expected to take state law concepts and definitions of economic 
relationships “as it finds them.” 
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Perhaps more troubling than the tax-induced shifts in state law 
concepts has been the tax-induced shifts in economic behavior. In the early 
years of the income tax, these shifts were largely the unintended 
consequence of the need to draw arbitrary lines, for instance between long- 
and short-lived assets or between ordinary taxable consumption and 
expenditures triggered by catastrophic events. But Congress has since 
become accustomed to manipulating the income tax for purposes other than 
revenue raising, as the 22 (as of this writing) separate credit provisions 
following Sections 45 and 48 of the Internal Revenue Code now attest. 
As a result of these shifts in its effects and its uses, the income tax, 
like the tariff a century ago, can no longer claim to be primarily serving its 
originally intended purposes. It can no longer (if it ever could) be viewed 
simply as a mechanism whereby a portion of what would otherwise be 
flows of capital between private parties are diverted to the government. 
And, like the impact of the tariff at the time of its demise, its overall effect 
on the economy remains uncertain. The international mobility of capital in 
the twenty-first century presents challenges for the income tax strikingly 
similar to those faced by state property tax schemes as they chased 
intangible wealth across state borders 100 years ago. Neither the impact of 
the income tax on individual taxpayer behavior nor its ultimate economic 
incidence is clearly understood, perhaps in part because they are changing 
too frequently. 
It may well be time to drop at least some of the rhetoric that has 
accompanied the income tax as a political institution, design variants that 
openly deal with its shortcomings, and reconfigure it to serve broader 
social goals more effectively. Adam Rosenzweig’s offering, A Corporate 
Tax for the Next One Hundred Years: A Proposal for a Dynamic, Self-
adjusting Corporate Tax Rate, is an example of such a potential 
repurposing of the income tax. Although his suggested tax would rely on a 
deceptively familiar concept of corporate income as its base, by altering its 
rate in response to the employment practices of taxpayers rather than 
simply according to their income level, the tax could “self-adjust” its 
ultimate incidence from employees to equity owners. 
Time will only tell what will become of the federal income tax, but 
there can be no doubt that it was part of an enormous change in the way the 
American public viewed the federal government over the course of the last 
one hundred years. 
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